2020 WI WC Rates & Status of the 2019 Agreed Bill

The 2019 WC Advisory bill is still pending in the Senate. There are very few items in the bill.

While neither TTD or PPD rates are impacted by the proposed changes, the max wage (and resulting TTD/PTD rate) did go up slightly, as did the rate for the private vocational counselor. The 2020 max rates are listed below:

2020 Rates:

Max TTD: $1,051.00
Max PPD: $362.00 (no change)
Monthly PPD: $1,568.67 (no change)

Max Death: $315,300.00
Max Disfigurement: $78,825.00
Max Private Vocational: $1,736.00

Our 2020 Rate Card we be mailed out shortly. If you would like to be added to the list, please contact our office.

Posted in Workers Compensation | Comments Off on 2020 WI WC Rates & Status of the 2019 Agreed Bill

2020 Federal Mileage Rate

The mileage rate this year is $.575 (down from last year’s rate of $.58). This is the rate used by the IRS, and is not the WC rate. The WC rate remains $.51.

https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-issues-standard-mileage-rates-for-2020

Posted in Workers Compensation | Comments Off on 2020 Federal Mileage Rate

Labor for Lodging – Can They be Exchanged?

O’Brien v. The Travelers Inn, LLC, Cir. Ct. No. 2018SC182

Appeal No. 2018AP1483 – Decision Dated March 21, 2019

Background:  O’Brien was an employee of Travelers Inn (Travelers) from July 1, 2016 through August 10, 2016.  She worked 54.5 hours during that period and received free lodging in lieu of a monetary wage.  The lodging was valued at $500.00 per month.  O’Brien filed a wage claim against Travelers Inn, alleging they failed to pay her the minimum wage of $7.25 per hour.  Because the lodging provided was valued at $500.00 per month, the circuit court prorated that over the period worked, finding the value of the lodging to be $662.00.  Therefore, Travelers “paid” O’Brien the equivalent of $12.17 per hour for her 54.5 hours of work. The circuit court concluded that Travelers paid more than the required minimum wage and dismissed the claim.  The applicant appealed the circuit court decision.

The Court of Appeals (CoA) determined that, to resolve this dispute, the Wisconsin and federal minimum wage statutes, along with applicable Wisconsin and federal administrative regulations, needed to be interpreted and applied to undisputed facts.

Wisconsin law states that every wage paid by an employer … shall be not less than the applicable minimum wage established under Wis. Stat. § 104.035.  Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 104.02 states that failure to pay, offering to pay, or agreeing to pay an employee lower or less in value than the applicable minimum wage is a violation of the statute.  The minimum wage for this matter is undisputed at $7.25 per hour.  Further, Wisconsin law specifically addresses lodging in exchange for labor in Wis. Stat. § 104.03 5(1)(b)1, which says if an employer furnishes an employee with lodging, the employer can deduct up to $58 per week or $8.30 per day.  Therefore, Travelers owed O’Brien a minimum wage of $395.13 and was able to deduct a maximum of $331.50 from the wage owed.  Therefore, Travelers owed O’Brien an additional $63.63 [$395.13 – $331.50] in some form other than lodging (i.e., cash).

Because Travelers failed to meet this obligation, it violated Wisconsin law.  The CoA rejected Travelers Inn’s argument that the value of the lodging exceeded the applicable minimum wage, because the contention “sidesteps” the Wisconsin lodging deduction restrictions.  It also rejected their argument that O’Brien would be able to contract around the provisions for the same reason.  Travelers also argued that the Department of Workforce Development (DWD) provisions regarding the value of lodging as it applied to employer contributions to unemployment insurance (UI) demonstrated the value can exceed the amounts listed in Wis. Stat. § 104.03 5(1)(b)1.  The CoA rejected this argument as well, stating that those provisions did not apply outside the context of employer contributions to UI.

Federal law via the Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA), together with the Department of Labor’s administrative regulations interpreting the FLSA, established the minimum wage under federal law.  This is equal to the minimum wage under Wisconsin law.  The FLSA also states that, if an employer furnishes lodging to an employee as part of wages owed, the wages are to include the reasonable cost of the lodging.  “Reasonable cost” cannot be more than the actual cost to the employer.  Importantly, to claim a lodging deduction, employers must satisfy various FLSA requirements that were established with the intent of prohibiting the use of such a payment to avoid the federal minimum wage law. These requirements include keeping records regarding the lodging deduction;  therefore, employers cannot claim a lodging deduction if they did not comply with the record-keeping requirement (Travelers did not).

Conclusion:  Travelers failed to satisfy its obligation to pay O’Brien the minimum wage under both Wisconsin and Federal laws.

What does this mean?  To claim a lodging deduction, Wisconsin employers must comply with both federal and state minimum wage and record-keeping requirements.  Further, if labor is exchanged for lodging, the value of that exchange is capped and additional wages beyond that cap are owed to any employee working in that capacity.  Employees also cannot enter into contracts that seek to circumvent minimum wage requirements.

What is the Practical Takeaway?  As an employer, if you wish to enter into this type of an arrangement with an employee, make sure you keep adequate records detailing the amount deducted for lodging and review your payment policies to ensure compliance with the applicable state and federal regulations.  If you have any questions about compliance or how the regulations apply to your business, contact our office to discuss.

Posted in Employment | Comments Off on Labor for Lodging – Can They be Exchanged?

Why Medical History Matters

Vallier v. Labor and Industry Review Commission, Aurora Health Care, Inc., and Sentry Insurance Co., Circuit Court No. 2017CV6073, Appeal No. 2018AP936

Court of Appeals Decision Dated and Filed February 26, 2019. This is an unpublished decision and holds no precedential value.

Background: Vallier worked as a nurse for Aurora St. Luke’s.  She alleged an injury after she struck her a right elbow and shoulder on the corner of the wall as she exited a patient’s room.  She reported the injury the same day, but did not seek treatment until the following day.  Vallier was examined by Dr. Petro on November 11, 2010.  The exam and x-ray were normal.  Despite the normal exam, Vallier continued to treat for numbness and tingling that extended from her right shoulder through her right hand.  Due to the continued complaints, Dr. Petro ordered an EMG, which showed lower cervical radiculopathy.  Following the EMG, Dr. Petro ordered a cervical MRI, which showed a large disc extrusion at the C6-7 level.  Vallier subsequently saw Dr. White, who recommended a C6-7 disc replacement and put Vallier on light duty work restrictions.  Vallier sought a second opinion with Dr. Lloyd; he confirmed Dr. White’s diagnosis. 

Dr. Lyons, a neurosurgeon, did an IME for the respondents.  He also confirmed the diagnosis, but concluded it was not work-related.  Vallier continued to treat with Dr. Lloyd, and ultimately underwent a discectomy and fusion at C6-7.  Dr. Lloyd said Vallier had pre-existing degenerative changes in her neck, but this was precipitated, aggravated, or accelerated beyond its normal progression by the November 19, 2010 incident.  After a worker’s compensation hearing, the ALJ decided Vallier was entitled to compensation for temporary total disability and permanent partial disability.  The ALJ stated Dr. Lloyd’s medical reports credible, stating “it was not until the work incident that she had trouble”.   Aurora petitioned LIRC for a review.  LIRC reviewed Vallier’s medical records and reversed the ALJ determination.  Importantly, LIRC found the credibility of Vallier’s treating physicians was “diminished” and incomplete because Vallier did not inform them that she had seen her primary care provider for right shoulder pain in August 2010, prior to the claimed work incident.  LIRC also found this diminished Vallier’s credibility.  Vallier filed a petition for judicial review and the circuit court affirmed LIRC’s decision.

Vallier appealed again; she argued (1) there was no credible and substantial evidence in the record to support LIRC’s determination, and (2) LIRC exceeded its authority by basing its decision on an erroneous finding of material fact.  The Court of Appeals (CoA) noted LIRC’s decision was based on its evaluation of conflicting medical evidence and incomplete opinions from Vallier’s providers (issues of fact); therefore, they found LIRC’s factual findings to be supported by substantial and credible evidence.  The CoA also noted LIRC’s decision was based on credibility determinations, so Vallier’s challenge regarding an erroneous finding of fact was not material to the determination.  Moreover, LIRC disregarded the medical opinions after August 2010 because they were based on inaccurate or incomplete information.

What does this mean?  When LIRC’s decisions are based on an issue of fact, their findings are conclusive on appeal as long as they are supported by credible and substantial evidence.  Evidence is credible if it excludes speculation and conjecture.  Further, LIRC must deny benefits if a legitimate doubt exists as to the facts necessary to establish a claim.  In worker’s compensation, claimants must prove all facts beyond a legitimate doubt.  If “facts” essential to recovery are based on inaccurate or incomplete information, the claimants do not meet this burden.

What is the practical takeaway?  Medical opinions are only as good as the facts those opinions are based on.  Comprehensive review of medical records is essential because it provides an opportunity to determine whether a claimant’s providers have based their opinions on a complete understanding of the claimant’s medical history.  This case is an excellent example of how important medical history and review of past records is to defending a worker’s compensation claim.  Additionally, this shows how information gathering can be a difference maker in litigated matters.

Posted in Workers Compensation | Comments Off on Why Medical History Matters

2019 IRS Mileage Rate

The 2019 IRS mileage rate has increased to 58 cents per mile. This is different than the Wisconsin work comp mileage rate; that remains at 51 cents per mile.

Posted in Workers Compensation | Comments Off on 2019 IRS Mileage Rate

Healing Period: Who Determines When This is Reached and When is TTD Owed?

In its recent decision in Wittmann v. Consolidated Lumber Co., et al, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals determined that the weight and credibility of medical evidence, as applied to worker’s compensation and employment matters, is to be determined by the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC), not by the reviewing courts.  The court expressly adopted LIRC’s determination of factual findings and conclusions of law regarding a disputed healing period and disability benefits determination.

This is a significant decision, given the recent budget proposals advocating the minimization of LIRC regarding worker’s compensation matters.  Additionally, this decision provides clear guidance on the interpretation of compensability of injuries as they relate to salaried employees who do not require work restrictions, as well as on disputed end of healing determinations.

The court based its decision on the on the Brakebush Bros decision (210 Wis. 2d at 630), stating “the weight and credibility of medical evidence are to be determined by LIRC, and not by the reviewing court.”  The Court of Appeals expressly adopted the findings of LIRC, not the Circuit Court citing the above case.  The Court stated LIRC’s findings regarding healing period determinations when supported by substantial evidence in the record, are to be given weight, even when continued treatment is sought for other problems regarding the same body part, although separate from the claimed injury.

Further, it determined that when no work restrictions are imposed and there are no lost wages during the healing period, a claim for disability benefits based outside the healing period is not a sustainable argument.  The mere fact that an employee continues to seek treatment after the healing period ends, is not a sufficient eligibility determination for temporary total disability benefits.

Posted in Workers Compensation | Comments Off on Healing Period: Who Determines When This is Reached and When is TTD Owed?

Does Appointing a Registered Agent Constitute Consent to General Jurisdiction in Wisconsin?

In Ambac, et al v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., the Supreme Court of WI determined a foreign corporation’s compliance with Wis. Stat §180.1507 and §180.1510 did not subject the corporation to general jurisdiction in WI.

In a complaint filed in 2014, Ambac alleged it incurred substantial liability due to Countrywide’s misrepresentation of mortgage backed securities.  Countrywide moved to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction.  Ambac argued Countrywide consented to general jurisdiction in WI when it appointed a registered agent under Wis. Stat. §180.1507 and §180.1510.

The question before the Court was whether or not compliance with §180.1507 constituted consent to general jurisdiction in WI, as argued by Ambac.  The Court disagreed with Ambac’s interpretation, stating that general jurisdiction cannot be read into §180.1507 and §180.1510 by the Court without expanding the meaning of the statute to the point that the Court would essentially be redrafting the statutes, a task not meant for them.  The text of the statutes in question were devoid of any language regarding either consent or jurisdiction, and thus must be read that way.

Further, the Court stated reading in registered agent appointments as consent to general jurisdiction would eliminate the need to establish grounds for specific jurisdiction under Wis. Stat. §801.05(1)(d), and thus make a foreign corporation’s contacts with the State irrelevant as long as it registered an agent for service of process, which all foreign corporations are required to do in order to transact business in Wisconsin.

For additional information, here is the link: https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/opinion/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=192346

Posted in Employment | Comments Off on Does Appointing a Registered Agent Constitute Consent to General Jurisdiction in Wisconsin?